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Law at the Margins: The Displacement
of Law as a Framework of Governance*
Dr. Fergus W. Ryan**
I.

Introduction

In his own idiosyncratic way, the late and lamented Master of
the English Rolls, Lord Alfred Denning, was one of the legal
profession's more unlikely feminists.2 In his book, The Due Process
of Law, Lord Denning discusses, inter alia, his experiences as a
judge of the Family Division of the English and Welsh High Court
from 1944 onwards. In the course of his reminiscences, he outlines
what he terms "The Story of Emancipation,"3 a treatise on the rise
of gender equality. Having considered the historic disadvantages

* This article is based on selected themes from a Ph.D. thesis recently
accepted by Trinity College, University of Dublin. In an earlier format, it was
delivered as a paper at the Law and Society Association/Research Committee on
Sociology of Law Joint Conference, 2001, at the Central European University,
Budapest, Hungary. The author wishes to thank the following persons for their
invaluable assistance in the completion of this work: Mr. Bruce Carolan, Head of
the Department of Legal Studies in the DIT; Mr. Eoin O'Dell, Lecturer in Law at
Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland; Professor William Duncan, First Secretary to the
Hague Convention on Private Law; and Professor Linda Lacey of the University of
Tulsa, Oklahoma.
All errors and opinions, of course, are the exclusive
responsibility of the author.
** LL.B. (Hons.) (Dub.), Ph.D. (Dub.). Fergus Ryan, a graduate and former
scholar of Trinity College, Dublin University, is a lecturer in law at the Dublin
Institute of Technology, Dublin, Ireland.
2. Though Lord Denning had rather fixed views about the respective roles of
men and women, there is no doubting that he believed strongly in the fundamental
human equality of men and women. See for instance his early legal efforts on
behalf of the deserted wife in H. v. H., [1947] 63 T.L.R. 645; and in the National
Provincial Bank v. Hastings Car Mart Ltd., [1964] Ch. 665. See also (on the
equitable interests of spouses in the family home) his decision in Rimmer v.
Rimmer, [1953] 1 Q.B. 63. In Jeremiah v. Ministry of Defence (Crt. of App., Oct.
19, 1979) he pronounced that "equality is the order of the day. In both directions.
For both sexes. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander."
3. Originally delivered as an address to the (British) National Marriage
Guidance Council in 1950.
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and disabilities that plagued the advance of women in the past,
Lord Denning then proceeds to address more recent developments:
By a series of Acts of Parliament .. . starting in 1870, all the

disabilities of wives in regard to property have been swept away.
A married woman is now entitled to her own property and
earnings, just as her husband is entitled to his ....

No longer is

she dependent on her husband. She can, and does, go out to
work and earn her own living. Her equality is complete.4

Certainly there can be no doubting the advance of the cause of
female emancipation in the past 150 years. Great strides have been
made-in the legal, political, socio-economic and cultural spheres
alike-in the promotion of gender equality.'
It is fallacious,
however, to suggest (as his Lordship seems to do), that legal steps
designed to assert the formal legal equality of women have
eliminated in fact all barriers to full gender equality.6 The implicit
suggestion in Lord Denning's comments is that the oppression of
women is and was primarily a product of law. As such, that
oppression could be swept away by simple legislative intervention.
Here, Lord Denning seems to have committed the error, (noted by
the Scottish philosopher, David Hume)7 of confounding the
prescriptive (how things ought to be) with the descriptive (how
things in fact are). Lord Denning, in other words, assumes that
because the law says that women ought to be treated as equals, that
gender equality is, as he puts it, "complete." The reality, of course,
is very different. Despite valiant legislative moves to assert formal

4.

LORD ALFRED DENNING, THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 200 (Butterworth's

1980). See also the discussion in SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 11-14
(Routledge 1989).
5. Some random (if symbolic) Irish examples may suffice. Ireland now has a
female President (the second woman in succession to hold the post), a female
Deputy Prime Minister (Tdnaiste), 2 female Supreme Court judges and 4 female
High Court judges. Twenty-five years ago, by contrast, not one of these positions
had ever been held by a woman.
6. Feminist commentators ably demonstrate that even despite moves to
assert the formal equality of the sexes, men remain the privileged gender. For
example, see SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (Routledge 1989); and
SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND (Routledge 1984).
7.

DAVID HUME,

University Press 1978).

A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

§ 3.1.1 (Oxford

20011

LAW AT THE MARGINS

equality between the sexes,' men remain the (unfairly) privileged
gender.9
At their heart, Lord Denning's comments are more than a
(rather na've) statement of gender equality. They are in effect an
assertion of the primacy of law as a determinant of patterns of
social behavior. While there can be no doubting Lord Denning's
bona fides in this regard," his rhetoric seems misguided. The
purpose of this article is to discuss and hopefully demonstrate the
fallacy of this stance, in particular by observing the impact of
certain relational factors on the behavior of individuals in both the
commercial and familial contexts alike. It is argued that these
relational factors can reduce the extent to which parties are willing
or indeed able to resort to the law where legal obligations and
duties have been breached. Ultimately it is argued that the stance
taken by Lord Denning tends to over-estimate the impact of the
law in shaping social responses.

8. In Ireland, see Arts. 9.1.3, 16.1, 40.1 and 45, Constitution of Ireland, 1937;
Sex (Disqualification) Act, 1919; The Interpretation Acts, 1937-1991; The AntiDiscrimination (Pay) Act, 1974; The Employment Equality Acts, 1977-1998; The
Equal Status Act, 2000; and Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar.
25, 1957, arts. 13 and 141. See also, the court decisions in de Btrca v. Attorney
General, [1976] I.R. 38; T.O'G. v. An Bord Ucht~la, [1985] I.L.R.M. 61; McKinley
v. Minister for Defence, [1992] 2 I.R. 333; W. v. W., [1993] 2 I.R. 476. But see,
Somjee v. Minister for Justice, [19811 I.L.R.M. 324; and Dennehy v. Minister for
Social Welfare, unreported, High Court, July 26, 1984 (where discrimination based
on gender was upheld as constitutional by the Irish Courts). See generally
Scannell, The Constitution and the Role of Women, in DE VALERA'S
CONSTITUTION AND OURS (Gill and Macmillan 1988).
9. For example, see CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW
(Routledge 1989); and CAROL SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND (Routledge 1984).
10. The late Master of the Rolls seems to have adopted something of a
"separate but equal" philosophy concerning gender equality. (Cf The dubious
logic of the U.S. Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) where
the U.S. Supreme Court found that a state law requiring separate rail carriages for
blacks and whites was not unconstitutional, provided that the carriages were of
equal quality. See also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). This reasoning was
overturned in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) where
a differently constituted Supreme Court ruled that separate schooling facilities for
children of different races necessarily implied racial inequality and thus offended
the guarantee of equal treatment in the U.S. Constitution). Men and women, Lord
Denning asserts, are different in many ways. In the Due Process of the Law,
however, he refuses to accept that these supposed differences were "any reason for
putting women under the subjection of men. A woman feels as keenly, thinks as
clearly as a man ... . She has as much right to her freedom-to develop her
personality to the full-as a man.... Neither is above or under the other. They
are equals." LORD ALFRED DENNING, THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 194-95 (1980).
But see also SMART, supra note 9, at 11-14.
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"Discrete" and "Relational" Models of Contracting

The road from the pronouncement of legal objectives to their
realization in fact is one strewn with many barriers and
contingencies. Becker," for instance, argues how the success of an
enacted law depends on the "moral enterprise" of various agents
with sufficient popular and official support to implement effectively
the relevant legislation. The presence of a law, in other words, does
not guarantee that the mischief against which it is directed will
automatically be eliminated.
For the purposes of this discussion, this article will focus partly
on the success of the law in addressing instances of duress and
undue influence that arise in the context of continuing contractual
and familial relations. More often than not, economic actors
contract in a context of ongoing social and economic relationships
on which their ultimate wellbeing is contingent.
The basic
argument propounded is that the existence of these relations can to
a greater or lesser extent reduce the likelihood of relief being
sought by the victim of the coercive activity.
In many respects this is a rather simple argument. It is one,
nonetheless, that traditionally seems to have been suppressed in
legal discourses. These legal discourses have typically tended to
ignore the dynamic of the ongoing relation as a factor worthy of
regard in analyzing the impact of laws. Classical contract law
doctrine, in particular, has overwhelmingly favored a "discrete
analysis" of legal events, one that views contractual phenomena in
isolation from the context in which they arise. 2 The modern
contract is characteristically seen as a discrete and isolated event,
giving rise to an arrangement of specific and delimited purpose."
Preceding and subsequent relations between the parties are ignored
as irrelevant.

11.

HOWARD

S.

BECKER,

OUTSIDERS:

STUDIES IN

THE

SOCIOLOGY

OF

DEVIANCE, (Free Press, 2nd ed. 1973).
12. But see, Roscoe Pound, The End of Law in Juristic Thought (II), 30 HARV.
L. REV. 201 (1917), who maintains that traditionally at common law "the central
idea [was always the] ... relation." Id. at 212. Pound illustrates how the common
law was founded upon (and indeed in some respects continued to look to) status or
the "relation" as a determinant of legal rules. Id at 213. In this sense, perhaps,
modern contract doctrine is distinctively out of step with its common law origins.
13. See Victor Goldberg, Towards an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract,
10 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 45, 49 (1976) ("The Paradigmatic contract of neo-classical
economics.., is a discrete transaction in which no duties exist between the parties
prior to the contract formation and in which the duties of the parties are
determined at the formation stage.").
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This "discrete" contract, as it is known, came to be the
paradigm of classical and neo-classical contractual discourses and

has, as such, played a predominant part in the shaping of modern
contract law.'

This paradigm takes as its subject the individual

almost entirely abstracted from context. It is no small coincidence,
then, that it first gained currency as a model of social interaction at
a time when economic liberalism and the principles of laissez-faire
were to the forefront of economic thought. 5 Both are predicated
on the construction of the individual as an atomized unit acting
independently of greater authority, and free from all but the most
inevitable of fetters and restrictions. Both treat the parties to a
contract as persons free from all contingencies, duties and
expectations save those created by the contract itself. This
abstraction, Friedman notes "is a deliberate renunciation of the
particular, a deliberate relinquishment of the temptation to restrict

14. Rules requiring the specificity of contracts provide a good example of its
influence. A contract should not be vague or uncertain and will often be struck
down on the ground that its terms cannot be readily ascertained. See Loftus v.
Roberts, [1902] 18 T.L.R. 532 (C.A.), the dictum of Viscount Dunedin in May &
Butcher v. R., [19341 2 K.B. 17 (note) at 21; and Scammell v. Ouston, [19411 1 All
E.R. 14. On uncertainty of terms see the Irish case of Mackey v. Wilde, [1998] 2
I.L.R.M. 449. The concept of privity of contract provides another good example.
Privity "ring-fences" the contract, denying all but the parties to the contract of any
right to sue on foot of such contract. The doctrine is most notably illustrated by
the decision in Tweddle v. Atkinson, [1861] 1 B. & S.393. A and B agreed to pay
C, B's son, an amount of money on C's marriage to A's daughter. C later sued A's
estate for the promised sum. The Court refused to order payment, partly on the
ground that consideration did not flow from C, but additionally because C was not
a party to the contract and could not, therefore, assert its terms. See Arthur L.
Corbin, Contractsfor the Benefit of Third Parties, 46 L.Q.R 12 (1930). On privity
generally see ROBERT CLARK, CONTRACT LAW IN IRELAND Ch. 17 (Round Hall,
4th ed. 1998); and RAYMOND FRIEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT Ch. 9 (Round Hall,
2nd ed. 2000). See also Murphy v. Bower, [1866] I.R. 2 C.L. 506; Clitheroe v.
Simpson, [1879] 4 L.R. Ir. 59; Mackey v. Jones, [1959] 93 I.L.T.R. 177; Dunlop v.
Selfridge, [1915] A.C. 847; Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Assurance Co. of
New York, [1933] A.C. 70; and the commentary of Peter Karsten, The "Discovery"
of Law by English and American Jurists in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth and
Nineteenth centuries: Third-party Beneficiary Contracts as a Test Case, 9 LAW &
HIST. REV. 327 (1991). The rule has been diluted considerably in some parts of the
U.S., for instance in New York (Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859)) and in
Massachusetts (Choate v. S.C.A. Services, Inc., (1979) N.E.2d 1045) as well as in
Australia (See the decision of the majority in the Australian High Court in Trident
General Insurance v. McNiece Bros. Pty. Ltd., (1988) C.L.R. 107. Pressure for
change (see for instance Lords Scarman and Keith in Woodar Investment Ltd. v.
Wimpey Ltd., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 277; and Lord Diplock in Swain v. Law Society
[1983] 1 A.C. 598, 611). This trend has ultimately led, in Britain, to the dilution of
the doctrine of privity by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999.
15. See generally PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT (Oxford University Press 1979).
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untrammeled individual autonomy
or the completely free market in
6
the name of autonomy.'

There is obviously a certain attraction in this image for those
who wish to ignore the infinite complexities of social relations in
favor of a tidy, predictable model of contracting practice.

The

discrete paradigm may certainly possess what Goldberg 7 termed an
"elegance" of sorts, though this is arguably at the expense of a
comprehensive model rooted in the reality of modern contracting.

Nevertheless, beginning in the late 1960s and early 70s, 8 a number
of commentators began to dispute the appropriateness or relevance
of the discrete contractual paradigm as a model for the study of

contractual phenomena. As a paradigm of contract law, it was
contended, the discrete contract is neither particularly descriptive
nor helpful. In particular, it is argued that the unwitting preoccupation with the neo-classical fairy-tale of discrete-contracting has
blunted the law's effectiveness in regulating and ordering modern

contractual relations.
Starting in the 1960s, two American academics, Ian Macneil 9
and Stewart Macauley, ° spearheaded an influential challenge to the
stranglehold that the discrete contractual paradigm had over
16. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (University of
Wisconsin 1965).
17. See Goldberg, supra note 13, at 49.
18. Although see the earlier comments of Roscoe Pound, in The End of Law
in Juristic Thought (II), in which he identifies the relation (or the status-contract)
as the dominant socio-legal model used in the common law. Pound, supra note 12,
at 201.
19.

See

IAN R.

MACNEIL,

CONTRACT,

EXCHANGE

TRANSACTIONS AND

RELATIONS (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1978); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of
Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of
Long-term Economic Relations under Classical, Neo-classical and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT (1979); Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of ContractualRelations, in
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 61-92 (Butterworth's 1981); Ian R. Macneil,

Economic Analysis of ContractualRelations: Its Shortfalls and the need for a "Rich
Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1018 (1981). On relationalism, see
generally Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA.
L. REV. 1089 (1981); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Relational Contracts; and Ewan
McKendrick, The Regulation of Long-Term Contracts in English Law, in GOOD
FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW (Clarendon

Press 1995); and Oliver

Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1981). See also Roscoe Pound, The End of Law in
Juristic Thought (II), 30 HARV. L. REV. 201, 212 (1917), who maintains that the
relation was and remained in 1917 a central concept in the common law.
20. Stewart Macauley, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963); Stewart Macauley, The Use and
Non-use of Contracts, 9 PRAC. LAW. 13 (1963); and Stewart Macauley, An
Empirical View of Contract [1985] WISC. L. REV. 465.
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modern contract doctrine. They argued (albeit with differing
emphases) that as a model it was neither realistic nor useful in
describing and analyzing modern contractual relations. At the
center of their thesis is the proposition that the discrete model
thrives on the false premise that the vast bulk of contracting
practices could realistically be critiqued as discrete events divorced
from context. In fact, as both commentators stress,2' the discrete
transaction is in fact a rarity, a marginal phenomenon. Instead,
most contracts, much like marriage,22 are struck and operate within
the context of, or at the very least as a prelude to, an ongoing
relationship, commercial or otherwise, between the parties.
Classical and Neo-classical contract doctrine alike have ignored
these "relational aspects" of contracting in favor of a tidy, abstract
conception of social intercourse ill-befitting a complex post-industrial society.23 In ring-fencing the contractual event, the discrete
perspective displaces explanations and analyses of contracting that
view the event in its wider context and seek to explain it in terms
that acknowledge the relations which gave rise to and shaped the
event's progress. This would have been objectionable, Eisenberg2 '
argues, "even if most contracts were discrete."
Even more
disturbing was the fact that the "tacit empirical premise" underlying
classical contract law "was entirely25 incorrect. Discrete contracts are
unusual not relational contracts.,
No contract, of course, can ever be entirely devoid of relational
aspects. Contract is quintessentially relational. It necessarily
presupposes the existence of social relations. Few contracts could
ever be made, after all, without a language common to both parties,
absent a shared understanding of the words and gestures used and a
minimal consensus as to their meaning. "[Tihe process of communication of the content of that exchange," Elliot notes, "cannot be
discrete to it but must be expressed in26 terms (language) derived
from social formations exogenous to it.
Relational Contract Theory, however, goes further. It looks at
contractual phenomena not in terms of discrete events but as part
21. Macauley using empirical research to underline his point. See Stewart
Macauley, An Empirical View of Contract[1985] WIsc. L. REV. 465.
22. See further the comments in the text below at note 28.
23. See Goldberg, supra note 13, at 49 ("[t]he elegance.. .of analytical models
based on choice has led economists to suppress the relational aspects of
contracts").
24. Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 297.
25. Id.
26. Elliott, The Frontiersmen,44 MOD. L. REV. 345, 346 (1981) (reviewing The
New Social Contract).
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of the wider, ongoing relationships in which they arise or to which
they give rise. The relational perspective thus poses a counter to
the hegemony of the discrete transaction, allowing the scrutiny of
contracting along a discrete-relational spectrum. 7 Perhaps the best

example of a relational contract is one derived from outside the
commercial field-marriage. Marriage is after all the quintessential
relation "contract" (if the latter term is even appropriate)." The
parties commit potentially for life29 to an arrangement that is vague
in detail and that presupposes great flexibility, mutual trust and
intertwined interests. Indeed, the parallels between marriage and
relational theory are not always lost on contractual commentators,
as underlined by a rather colorful quotation from Gordon.' "In the
'relational' view of Macauley and Macneil," he comments "parties
treat their contracts more like marriages than like one-night
stands."31
Like marriage the long-term contractual relationship acts more
as a framework for engagement than as a strict agenda of terms and
conditions. As a result, the relational perspective displaces the
possibility of what economists term "contingency-claims" contracting, where all relevant and possible future events are encompassed
by the terms of the agreement itself. Contingency-claims contract-

27. In a colorful feminist analysis of contracting, Peter Goodrich suggests that
these alternate poles represent, respectively the paradigms of masculine-type and
feminine-type contracting. Peter Goodrich, Gender and Contracts, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAW 17-46 (Cavendish 1996).
While commending this article highly, it is submitted that this analysis ignores
other feminist and queer theoretical perspectives. These propound the dangers
inherent in assuming that certain characteristics or personality traits can be
assumed to be the sole preserve of one gender rather than the other. Goodrich
arguably does his own gender a disservice in typecasting it as the equivalent of a
decontextualized, rather brutish paradigm of contracting.
28. The term "contract" is one that can at best be uneasily applied to
marriage. Marriage, after all, does not typically fit the profile of a stereotypical
contract. Statute and common law lay down many of the "terms" of marriage.
Few of these terms are, or can be, negotiated between the parties. Unlike most
contracts, furthermore, the law will only allow a person to be a party to one
marriage at a time and strictly limits the range of persons with whom one may
contract. Imagine, by contrast, if the law required that one may only contract to
sell one's car to a person of the opposite sex not being a close relation or a person
who already owned a car!
29. But see Art. 41.3.2, Constitution of Ireland, 1937, and the Family Law
(Divorce) Act, 1996 which now permit the possibility of a dissolution of marriage
in Ireland.
30. Robert W. Gordon, Macauley, Macneil and the Discovery of Solidarity and
Power in Contract Law, [1985] Wisc. L. REV. 565. (Quoted in S. WHEELER & J.
SHAW, CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 83 (Clarendon Press 1994)).
31. Id.
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ing assumes full "presentation, 32 that is, all possible opportunities
and avenues, risks and pitfalls which the future may throw up are
"made present" in the contract and provided for as the parties
desire. The contract is taken to provide comprehensively for all
future contingencies. Absent the allocation of a particular risk, it is
assumed that the parties intend the risk, if realized, to lie where it
falls.
Even if such "full presentation" were possible in a discrete
context,33 it is certainly neither feasible nor helpful as a means of
governance in long-term relationships. Instead, such arrangements
tend (regardless of the actual terms of the initial contract upon
which the relation is based) to be open-ended in nature. "The
participants," Macneil observes,
never intend or expect to see the whole future of the relation as
presentiated at any single time, but view the relation as an
ongoing integration of behavior to grow and vary with events in
a largely unforeseeable future (e.g., a marriage, a family
business). 34
The relational contract, hence, far from strictly delineating the
content of the contractual relationship, acts as a broad framework
within which the parties act to their mutual benefit. The norms and
understandings governing the relation tend to be dynamic rather
than static, developing in tandem with and by reference to the
relation itself, adjusting to new situations and opportunities as they
arise. Disputes are typically resolved by compromise rather than
conflict. Indeed, dogged reliance on one's strict legal rights is seen
as potentially inimical to the survival of the relation in the long

32. Made present in time, anticipated, providing for all possible future
contingencies and risks in one contractual event. See Goldberg, supra note 13, at
51; and Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations, in THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 64-67 (Butterworth's 1981).

33. The high transaction costs of providing for each possible contingency
probably render such foresight disproportionate not to mention prohibitively
expensive in most cases.
34. IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACT, EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS & RELATIONS 13
(Foundation Press 2d ed. 1978). The same author, in another publication, observes
that:
two common characteristics of long-term contracts are the existence of
gaps in their planning and the presence of a range of processes and
techniques used by contract planners to create flexibility in lieu of either
leaving gaps or trying to plan rigidly.
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations under
Classical, Neo-classical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. R. 854, 865

(1978).
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run.35 Instead, the parties act to their mutual benefit with a view to
sustaining good relations with their co-contractors. 6 Indeed, the
prospect of the long-term benefits of maintaining the relationship
often influence parties to forego short-term gain in discrete transactions or to make ostensibly altruistic yet calculated concessions
with a view to long term gain. 7 In Macauley's words, "the value of
these relations means that all must work to satisfy each other." 8

Thus, "[p]otential disputes are suppressed, ignored or compromised
in the services of keeping the relationship alive."'3 9
Mutual trust is the cornerstone of relational contracting. Like
marriage, no long-term contract can survive healthily in an environment of mistrust and suspicion. Equity recognizes this fact in
refusing as a general principle to order specific performance of
contracts ' involving the rendering of a service or the re-instatement
of an employee."

In Page One Records v. Britton,2 for instance,

35. See Steve Hedley, Contracts as Promises, 44 N. IRELAND L.Q. 12, 13
(1993), who notes that a party who insists on asserting the strict letter of his legal
rights against another may generally expect never to do business with the latter
again.
36. This idea of mutual self-interest seems to be embedded in the "best
practice" models of those who teach business negotiation skills. An advertisement
for Dr. Chester Karrass's business negotiation workshops advises that "[clontrary
to common perception, great negotiators do not dominate their adversaries. In
fact, they do not see them as adversaries. We teach you to build solid, long-term
relationships that satisfy both parties ... . By asking the right kind of questions
and delving into the other person's true needs, deals can be made that leave both
parties feeling that they got a bargain." Advertisement in AM. WAY, Aug. 15,
2001, 85-88.
37. Cf.the concept of "enlightened self-interest" propounded by the Scottish
philosopher David Hume (DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (173940)). See also the discussion in PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 52-57 (Clarendon 1979). See also ADAM SMITH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 14, 421-23 (1937 ed.). Both Hume and Smith argued that a
trader best promoted his own interests by attending to those of his customers.
Being honorable, reliable and dependable in the service of customers would
ultimately result in the promotion of the trader's own longer-term self interest.
38. Stewart Macauley, An Empirical View of Contract, [1985] Wisc. L. REV.
465.
(Quoted in S. WHEELER & J. SHAW, CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 77 (Clarendon Press 1994)).
39. Id.
40. Or indirectly achieving the same result by means of the enforcement of a
negative covenant.
41. Ryan v. Mutual Tontine Association, [1893] 1 Ch. 116; Page One Records
v. Britton, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 157; and Posner v. Scott-Lewis [1987] Ch. 25. See also
Jones, Specific Performance of a Contract for Services, [1987] 47 C.L.J. 21. See
also, De Francesco v. Barnum, per Fry L.J. ("Courts are bound to be jealous lest
they should turn contracts of service into contracts of slavery."); but see Lumley v.
Wagner, [1852] 1 De G.M. & G. 604; and Warner v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209
where negative covenants were enforced precluding entertainers from working
other than for a specific employer. The courts argued, not convincingly in the
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Justice Stamp outlined the detrimental effects of "put[ting] pressure

upon" the members of a then famous rock-band, "to continue to
employ as a manager and agent in a fiduciary capacity one ... who
has duties of a personal and fiduciary nature to perform and in
whom [they] ...have lost confidence."43 Co-operation, good faith,

trust and discretion are, likewise, essential to the success of the
contractual relation.

Relations are expected to engender what

Gordon, amongst others, termed "organic solidarity."" Thus, it is
expected that "the benefits and burdens of the relation are to be
shared rather than entirely divided and allocated. ..,',Each party

is expected to take the rough with the smooth, to accept in
particular that it may be required, as a prerequisite to the maintenance of the relation, to forego its own advantage with a view to

supporting a co-contractor in difficulty. One is reminded, in
particular, of Macauley's observation that "[p]eople often renegotiate deals that have turned out badly for one or both sides. They

recognize a range of excuses much broader than those accepted in
most legal systems. '
Recognition of these characteristic features, Macneil argues, is
a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of "intellectually
coherent principles' ', of contract law, tailored to the effective

critique of modem contractual relations. If relational contracting
makes up the bulk of modern contracting (and, let us not forget,
familial) practices, then, it follows that legal discourses should be
sufficiently open-textured to cater to relational perspectives.48
latter case, that such enforcement was not equivalent in effect to specific
performance of an agreement to provide personal services. See also Irani v.
Southhampton & S.W. Hampshire Area Health Authority, [1985] I.C.R. 590 where
an injunction was imposed, there being no breach of trust between the parties to
the employment in question. See also Madden, Specific Performance of Contracts
of Employment, (1985) IRISH L. TIMES 135.
42. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 157.
43. Id. at 167.
44. Gordon, supra,note 30, at 569.
45.

IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACT, EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS

(N.Y. Foundation Press 2d ed. 1978). See also Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis
of Contractual Relations, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 69-70
(Butterworth's, 1981).
46. Macauley, supra note 38, at 467-68.
47. Macneil, as quoted in Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory,
(1990) U. CIN. L. REV. 1299-1302. (Reproduced in S. WHEELER & J. SHAW,
CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 73, (Clarendon Press 1994)).
48. Eisenberg proceeds an explicit step further. He rejects the assertion that
the relational contract should be the subject of special rules, arguing instead that
principles of contract modeled on the relational perspective would and should be
sufficiently broad-textured to cater even to discrete contracts. The latter being, he
maintains, the exception rather than the rule, it is the relational contract that
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Recognition of these factors should, furthermore, transform
perceptions about the dynamic of power relations (and correspondingly one's analysis of incidents of duress and undue influence).
Acknowledgement of the relational aspects of contracting opens up
the possibility of examining coercive forces that exist as a result of
situations of dependence engendered by the relation itself. Scrutiny
of the most appropriate legal responses to coercion should be
tailored accordingly.
III. The Relation as a Barrier to Legal Action
There is, that said, a certain irony, even pointlessness, in
arguing that legal doctrine should be so altered. The very dynamic
to which the relation gives rise, after all, to a large extent negates
and displaces the influence of legal norms and rules. In eschewing
strict legal rights and entitlements in favor of compromise and
commitment, the contractual relation gradually develops its own
framework of governance, a by-product of the dynamic internal to
the relation. In a similar vein, Macauley, drawing on his empirical
studies of "real life" contracting, observes that "contract planning
and contract law, at best, stand at the margin of important longterm continuing business relations."49 In their stead, one finds
private governance frameworks shaped by the particular needs of
the parties, their circumstances and ultimate business objectives.
The key point made herein is that when approaching the
phenomenon of coercion, (in legal language, duress and undue
influence), the impact of ongoing relations cannot be ignored.
When oppressive behavior arises in such a relation-be it a business
relationship or a familial one-the existence of the relation itself
jeopardizes the possibility of obtaining legal relief. Standard contract doctrine tends to ignore this issue. It stipulates, for instance,
that where a person alleges that she has been subjected to common
law duress, she should complain or protest (if necessary by commencing legal proceedings) at the earliest possible opportunity. °
should provide the model around which modern contract rules are framed.
Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 291-304.
49. Macauley, supra note 38, at 465 (Quoted in S. WHEELER & J. SHAW,
CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 76 (Clarendon Press 1994)).
50. See Judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in Pao On v.
Lau Yiu Long, [1980] A.C. 614, 635 stating that "[i]t is material to inquire whether
the person alleged to have been coerced did or did not protest." See also Justice
Millett, in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. v! Total Oil, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 87. In The
Atlantic Baron, [1979] Q.B, 705, for example, the presence of protest contributed,
it seems, to the initial conclusion that pressure had in fact been exerted in that
case. However, the plaintiffs had subsequently failed to complain either at the time
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This evidential requirement possibly arises from the common law's
sensible concern that the courts should not endeavor to seek out
the unspoken thoughts of a litigant. The Court proceeds not by

reference to "secret mental reservations"'" unknown and unknowable, but to the conduct of a person and the state of mind that the
latter would suggest to an ordinary reasonable person. 12 The
assertion of the relevance of subsequent protest, however, in itself
assumes that the incidence of coercion will be discrete and transient
rather than an endemic constant of certain relationships. The very

coercive practices of which the victim may wish to complain may
thus, in many instances, prevent that victim from protesting in a
manner desired or expected by the Courts of law.

In an ongoing relation such as marriage, coercive forces often
arise as a product of the relation itself. Parties may be forced to act
against their will in favor of maintaining the relation intact. Take
for instance the defendant in C.LB.C. Mortgages v. Pitt.53 In that
case, the defendant had alleged that in agreeing to stand surety for

her husband, she had been acting under the undue influence of her
spouse. Her husband had borrowed money from the plaintiff,
claiming that it was to be used for the mutual benefit of both him

and his wife. In fact, it was his intention (as she well knew) to use
the funds for his personal business interests. If so, why did Mrs. Pitt

not protest at the time the surety agreement was made? Her
response (noted by Fehlberg ' ) is highly instructive. At the heart of
her reasoning is a concern to maintain the stability of her relation-

of or prior to the payment of the final installments and the delivery of the ship.
"No protest of any kind was made" for some 2 years after the new arrangement,
the alleged product of coercion, had been entered into. Id. at 720. Though "free
from the duress" the plaintiffs "took no action by way of protest or otherwise"
until the formal claim for the return of the excess was made. Id. This, according to
the Court, was evidence of acquiescence in the result of the renegotiated contract.
Protest, however, is never relevant where a threat is legitimately imposed. It is not
relevant, for instance, where the protest is made in the face of a court order for
payment. See Bank of Montrdal v. Canada, [1993] F.C. 279 (cited at [1996]
RESTIT. L. REV. 149).
51. Deacon v. Transport Regulation Board, [1958] V.R. 458, 460.
52. On the principle of manifest intention (or objectivity) in contract law see
Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417
(1889); and Clare Dalton, An Essay on the Deconstructionof Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997, 1042 (1985).
53. [1994] A.C. 200.
54. Belinda Fehlberg, The Husband, the Bank, the Wife, her Signature, 57
MOD. L. REV. 467 (1994). See also Belinda Fehlberg, The Husband, the Bank, the
Wife, her Signature: the Sequel, 59 MOD. L. REV. 675 (1996); and Belinda Fehlberg,
Money and Marriage: Sexually Transmitted Debt in England, 11 INT'L J. OF L.
POL'Y & THE FAM. 320 (1997).
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ship with her husband. In the words of the judge at first instance in
that case,
[ijf she had refused to co-operate her life would have become a
nightmare .... As she said, "I'd rather have a peaceful life than
lots of money."55
In many cases then, protest in the face of coercion is only possible
(and herein lies the irony) if and when the alleged victim has freed
herself from the pressure alleged and the context that facilitated its
imposition. Mrs. Pitt, for instance, might well have complained to
her heart's delight. She might even have proceeded to court to sue
her husband; only that her marriage is unlikely to have survived the
strain. Lack of protest then may be highly equivocal as an
evidential factor in this field. It may certainly and quite feasibly
indicate contentment with arrangements made. It may be equally
consistent, however, with the fact that the silent party not only
entered into the impugned arrangements under compulsion but
remains in that state of compulsion arising from the circumstances in
which she finds herself. The irony, then, is that to plead duress or
undue influence almost necessarily requires that the party first have
independently sundered the relationship that fostered the
compulsion or abuse.
Effectively, the more important the relation to the parties in
question, the greater the stake each of the parties will have in its
maintenance. The greater this stake, the less likely it will be that
either party will wish to engage in transaction-rupturing litigation. 6
"Interdependence," Macneil says, "often generates forces tending
to keep [the relation] going and to make it a reliable basis for
conducting economic activities."57
This tallies with Howard
58
Becker's suggestion that social behavior largely can be determined
by a variety of contingencies to which one is subject. The greater
the stake one has in conforming to the norms of a group, he argued,
the less likely it is that the person will rebel against those norms."
55. Belinda Fehlberg, The Husband, the Bank, the Wife, her Signature, 57
MOD. L. REV. 467,473 (1994).
56. BECKER, supra note 11.
57. Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of ContractualRelations, in BURROWS
& VELJANOVSKI., THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 71 (Butterworth's, 1981).
58. BECKER, supra note 11.
59. Cf Stanley Cohen, DEVIANCE AND CONTROL 86-88 (Prentice Hall 1966).
Cohen uses the example of gay community in the U.S. in the 1960s to illustrate that

"[njot all homosexuals are equally immersed in this homosexual community; much
depends on the degree to which they still have emotional and material stakes in
their relationships with the conventional world." The greater these stakes, he
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A married man with children and a high-powered job is less likely
to offend against convention than a single man with no children and

no prospects, simply because the former's stake in conformity (in
conventional society, that is) is greater. He has, in short, more to
lose.

Litigation claiming coercion, then, in most cases presupposes
that the relation from which it arose has been sundered.' The irony

in cases involving coercion, thus, is that for the party to assert that
she was a victim of duress or undue influence, she must first break
free of the relation that gave rise to the coercive factors. A lack of

protest, far from negating the presence of undue pressure, may in
some circumstances provide firm evidence of its existence. This is

especially relevant in cases where the pressure arises from an
ongoing relation of some importance to the victim of the pressure.
The closer and more significant the relationship between the
parties, the less likely it is that coercion will lead to protest.6' If the
victim is free to take proceedings against the alleged perpetrator,
this presupposes that the victim has broken free of the coercive
forces of which she wishes to complain. Ironically, then, the
prospect of asserting one's freedom from coercive forces by legal
methods depends on the extent to which the alleged victim has
already freed herself from those coercive forces (presumably

otherwise than in reliance upon the law).
continues, the more tenuous and/or secretive will be their links with and
association with the gay community. Id.
60. A useful analogy may be drawn from Claire Archbold's commentary on
divorce in Northern Ireland. Claire Archbold, Divorce-the View from the North, in
THE DIVORCE

ACT

IN PRACTICE

(Round Hall, 1999). She maintains that divorce is

not the beginning but rather the end of a long process that leads to the dissolution
of a marriage. She rejects the assumption that parties wishing to end their
relationship typically begin by proceeding for divorce. Divorce, rather, usually
marks the conclusion of such a process.
[F]amily breakdown does not occur all of a piece. Rather it is an
incremental process; a massive emotional, mental, social and legal
transition. Few in Northern Ireland take the decision to divorce
immediately. Divorce is the final, rather than the central act in the legal
drama.
Id. at 54. (Emphasis added by present author).
61. It is worth observing that some of the most prominent British court cases
on legal duress in the past thirty years-North Ocean Shipping v. Hyundai ("The
Atlantic Baron"), [1978] 3 All E.R. 1170; and Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long, [1980] A.C.
614; Universe Tankships of Monrovia v. I.T.W.F. ("The Universe Sentinel"),
[1982] 2 All E.R. 67; Dimskal Shipping v. I.T.W.F. ("The Evia Luck"), [1999] 3
W.L.R. 875-share one feature in common. This feature is the virtual certainty,
from the start in some cases, that the parties would never do business with each
other again, either because the transaction was intended as a "once-off" event or
because relations between the parties had deteriorated to the point of no return.
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IV. The Development of Idiosyncratic Governance Frameworks
in Ongoing Relations
Parties to a relation, then, tend not to have recourse to the law
in dealing with conflict internal to the relation, unless the party
involved anticipates the ending of that relation. The threat to
ongoing arrangements within the relation will normally dissuade
actors from relying on their strict legal rights. As Hedley astutely
notes in the context of commercial relations:
[o]f course there are some markets where the participants are
happy to do business with another firm on Monday, sue them on
Tuesday and do business with them again on Wednesday;
though it would be surprising if they outweighed those where
"you don't read legalistic contract clauses if you ever want to do
62
business again.,

In business practice, thus, private third-party or even internal
arbitration methods will often be preferable to "transactionrupturing" litigation, particularly where the relation is ongoing
63 and
where both sides have made transaction-specific investments.
Here it is worth outlining some of the commentary based on
what is called "transaction cost economics. ' 6" A pivotal theme of
62. Hedley, Contracts as Promises, 44 N. IRELAND L.Q. 12, 13 (1993).
63. The Courts in Ireland at least, seem to respect this practice. In Doyle v.
Kildare Co. and Shackleton, [1996] 1 I.L.R.M. 252, the Supreme Court stated that
judges ought be slow to interfere with the decision of an adjudicator as, in the
words of Chief Justice Hamilton, "one of the cardinal principles of the law of
adjudication is that the parties are taken to have abandoned their right to litigate
the question in issue." Id. at 265. For evidence of similar sentiments, see the
judgment of Justice McCarthy in Keenan v. Shield Insurance Co. Ltd., [1988] I.R.
89, 96; and that of Chief Justice Finlay in McStay v. Assicurazoni Generali S.P.,
[1991] I.L.R.M. 237, 242. The latter stressed the finality of arbitration decisions,
noting the "reluctance of the courts to interfere with the finality of an arbitrator's
award."
64. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Contract Analysis: The TransactionCost Approach, in THE ECONoMIc APPROACH TO LAW (Butterworth's, 1981).
"Transaction Costs" are in the words of Arrow, The Organization of Economic
Activity: The Analysis and Evaluationof Public Expenditure: The PBB System, 4764, 48 (J. Econ. Comm., 91st Congress, 1st Sess., 1969), "the costs of running an
economic system .. " They can usefully be contrasted with "production costs."
See also BURROWS & VEUANOVSKI, Introduction, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
TO LAW 22 (Butterworth's, 1981), where the authors typify transaction-cost (or
what they call neo-institutional) economics as a model that rejects "the fiction of
frictionless markets." By contrast with market-based economic theories, which
assume perfectly static market conditions, transaction-cost economics favor an
analysis of market behavior in circumstances where friction, change and
uncertainty-and disequilibria in general-are acknowledged. It attempts to
pinpoint the adaptive techniques most appropriate for the minimization of
transaction costs in any given set of circumstances. Transaction-cost economics,
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neo-institutional economics is that transactional governance
structures-the framework under which transactions are organized
and conflicts resolved-will vary in form and substance depending
upon the transaction costs involved in administering each. These in
turn will vary depending on the dimensions of the contractual
relationship, identified by Williamson" as:
(1) the level of market uncertainty,
(2) the frequency of exchange,
(3) transaction-specificity or the idiosyncrasy of the goods
being exchanged/services being supplied.
Williamson's central thesis is that the greater these dimensions of
uncertainty, frequency and idiosyncrasy, the more likely it is that
the contractual relation will be governed by norms internal to the
relation.6 Correspondingly, the greater the degree of each of the
three dimensions mentioned, the less significant become standard
legal governance structures in the administration of the contractual
relationships involved. In other words, the greater the level of
market uncertainty, the higher the frequency of transactions
between the parties and the more idiosyncratic or specialized their
relation (i.e., the less "fungible" the goods), the more likely it is that
the parties will resort to private, idiosyncratic means of dispute
resolution. These means may be tri-lateral, (involving an impartial
third party, not being the State) or even bi-lateral (where no
outside involvement is anticipated).6 7
Those familiar with
contractual agreements of a long-term nature will of course attest to
the prevalence of the arbitration clause in many such contracts, a
clause that requires the parties to refer disputes to an impartial
private arbitrator.
Where the relation is particularly profound, mutual trust,
understanding and facilitation become essential to its survival. The
interests of each party become heavily bound up in those of the
while acknowledging the importance of contract law in promoting efficiency and
reducing transaction costs, eschews the market-based economic assumption that
commercial affairs are solely or mainly regulated by the market itself, or where
considerations of efficiency or market failure so dictate, legal rules and forms.
65. Williamson, supra note 60, at 39. See also Williamson, supra note 19, at
233.
66. Oliver E. Williamson, ContractAnalysis: The Transaction-CostApproach,
in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW (Butterworth's, 1981).
67. Williamson, supra note 60, at 51.
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other. The parties indeed move closer to a single utility-maximizing
unit. Techniques for the resolution of misunderstandings are thus
more likely to be internally dictated. The parties ring-fence their
relationship and depend largely on mutual give-and-take, foregoing
rather than contesting points of disagreement for the sake of the
relation as a whole. Strict legal rights increasingly fade into the
background. Where relations are particularly deep, then, the
parties often prefer to resolve conflicts using "bi-lateral" dispute
resolution mechanisms that require no outside involvement at all.
Frequency of dealing, coupled with the long-term duration of the
contract, increase the need for flexible, easily accessible governance
structures that facilitate easy solutions in cases of conflict. The
general legal system meets none of these criteria.
V.

The Role of the Legal Process in Discouraging Litigation

Indeed, the legal process itself often discourages litigation in
favor of private resolution. Macauley comments on how "[e]ven
when contract law might offer a remedy, the legal system in
operation promotes giving up or settling rights rather than adjudicating to vindicate rights." 68 The prospect of protracted litigation
and the attendant legal costs that it spawns, often deter potential
litigants from proceeding to trial. For many the gamble may not be
worth the fight. 69 For Macauley this underlines the marginality of
standard contract doctrine; it "operates," the former opines, "at the
margins of the major systems of private government through
institutionalized social structures and less formal social fields."7"
In the context of marriage, one sees such trends manifesting
themselves for example, in the guise of measures designed to
promote problem-solving outside the context of the courtroom, in
particular by means of mediation and other alternative dispute
resolution methods [ADR].71 In Ireland, both the Judicial Separa68. Stewart Macauley, An Empirical View of Contract [1985] Wisc. L. REV.
465. (As reproduced in S. WHEELER & J. SHAW, CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS

78 (Clarendon Press 1994)).

69. Id. Macauley refers to Galanter's observations on the dynamics of
litigation. The latter notes how larger litigants weed out challenge by "drawing
out" the legal process. Weaker parties unable to last the pace eventually falter and
settle.
70. Id. S. WHEELER & J. SHAW, CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 79
(Clarendon Press 1994)).
71. Usefully defined by a British National Consumer Council Report from
February 1993, as "any means of promoting a resolution of a dispute between two
or more parties which does not involve traditional adversarial procedures." See
Wilkins, Is there Another Way, 57 CONy. 321-26, 321 (1993).
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tion and Family Law Reform Act, 1989 and the Family Law
(Divorce) Act, 1996, contain provisions tacitly encouraging parties
who are seeking a legal separation or divorce to explore avenues
other than those of a judicial nature. The Family Law Act 19963
of England and Wales proceeds in a similar vein. As a condition
precedent to the granting of a divorce or legal separation, it
requires that the petitioning party issue "a statement of marital
breakdown."74 Following this statement's publication, however, the
Act requires that the parties enter upon a "period of reflection and
consideration,"75 lasting a minimum of nine months. 6 During such
time the party or parties seeking a remedy are obliged to attend an
informational meeting" at which they must be told (inter alia) about
the availability of "marriage counseling and other marriage support
services." 8
Westminster, furthermore, took the rare step of
''putting its money where its mouth is" in making provision for the
funding of marriage support services79 and the extension of the civil
legal aid scheme for family matters to mediation.0
The moral agenda of the Act is barely concealed. Freeman
observes that "[t]his is a divorce Act which is pro-marriage: it
encourages counseling, mediation, reconciliation, [and] the
promotion of good relationships."81 That said, it cannot be denied
that the intended result, however interventionist the motive, is the
dethron-ing of the court process in favor of private solutions. It is
arguable, of course, that the purpose of promoting reconciliation
will not, in most cases, be realized. The initiation of divorce

72. See Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act, §§ 5-8, 1989 and
Family Law (Divorce) Act, §§ 6-8, 1996.
73.

See MICHAEL FREEMAN, THE FAMILY LAW AcT 1996 (Sweet & Maxwell

1996).
74. Family Law Act (England and Wales), § 6, 1996. See generally FREEMAN,
supra note 66. See also Dyer, Divorce Bill Set to Include Talks and Waiting Times,
THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 7, 1998, at 5. The legislation generally proved controversial,
and generated some considerable debate especially amongst social conservatives
who saw initial proposals as an attempt to undermine the sanctity of marriage. See
Womack, Major Upset as MPs Force Retreat on Family Reform, IRISH TIMES, Oct.

28, 1995; and Millar, Reform of Divorce Law Hangs in the Balance, London Letter,
IRISH TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995.

75. Family Law Act (England and Wales), § 7, 1996.
76. This period may be further extended in certain circumstances. Id. at §§
7(4), 7(13).
77. Id. at § 8.
78. Id. at § 8(9); see also §§ 13-14.
79. Id. at §§ 22-23.
80. Family Law Act (England and Wales), Part III, § 26-29.
81. FREEMAN, supra note 73, at 27.
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proceedings invariably marks the formal end of a relationship.8 2
This is underlined by the experience of those partaking of
compulsory reconciliation procedures. As Bainham83 asks
How seriously.., will those administering the new Divorce Law
really take the injunction to push reconciliation when their
experience will already have taught them the simple truth that
reconciliation is, for the vast majority, a "dead duck" once a
public step towards divorce has been taken. 4
ADR, however, is not the sole preserve of marital
jurisprudence. It has also become the staple of many commercial
contracts, where parties agree to put disputes as regards the
meaning of contractual clauses to arbitration and in many cases to
accept the decision of the arbitrator as final. The Irish judiciary has
proved particularly supportive of these moves to dissuade parties
from court-based litigation. It has been correspondingly reluctant
to usurp the adjudicator's ascribed role by overturning decisions
made by virtue of such clauses. "Arbitration," according to Justice
McCarthy in Keenan v. Shield Insurance Co. Ltd.,8 "is a significant
feature of modern commercial life. ... It ill becomes the courts to
show any readiness to interfere in such a process."' The latter's
comments are cited with approval by Chief Justice Hamilton in
Doyle v. Kildare County Council and Shackleton,8 who adds that
the jurisdiction to quash the decision of an adjudicator, "should
only be exercised sparingly." 88 The Courts have also exhibited a
greater willingness to imply arbitration clauses into contracts, for
instance in Lynch Roofing Systems (Ballaghaderreen) Ltd. v.
Bennett and Son89 where the practice in the trade of including such
clauses was invoked in favor of reading an implied arbitration
clause into the parties' contract.
VI. The Symbolic Power of Law
In the light of this displacement of law, legal commentators will
face some difficulty in reasserting the relevance of law to the study
82. Cf. the comments of Archbold, supra note 60.
83. Bainham, 10 C. & FAM. L.Q. 1, 14 (1998).
84. Cf. the comments of Archbold, supra note 60. Her observation that
divorce usually comes at the end of a long process of marital breakdown would
seem to militate against such eleventh hour attempts at reconciliation.
85. [1988] I.R. 89.
86. Id. at 96.
87. [1996] 1 I.L.R.M. 252.
88. Id. at 265.
89. Unreported, High Court, Morris P., June 26, 1998.
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of contracts and other agreements. This problem is particularly
acute in the case of relational contracts. During the currency of the
relation, the governance frameworks springing from the relation
itself serve as the primary means of ordering the behavior of the
parties. The formal invocation of legal norms usually heralds the
denouement of the relation; in other words, the law asserts its
influence, if at all, at the point at which the relation is no longer
worth saving or indeed no longer susceptible to effective rescue.
Indeed, in the case of coercive practices, invocation of legal relief
(as demonstrated above) necessarily presupposes that the situation
of dependence that led to the coercion in the first place, has been
surmounted.
Asserting the impact of law in such complex relations thus
becomes an unenviable task. This perhaps is where the potential
symbolic and hortatory impact of laws may play a useful role.
Legal rules, as Dewar suggests, 90 can be viewed as "bright-lines"
designed not so much to be rigidly enforced but to induce certain
desirable behavior. Publicly visible enforcement can play an
ancillary role in propagating this message, but this is not to suggest
that a law that is rarely invoked or enforced is in fact unsuccessful.
Despite the marginalization spoken of above, the law of contracts
continues to exert an influence upon lawyers far exceeding its
relevance in practice. Its position as a core subject of legal
education grants it a privileged place in legal discourses: "Like the
reality constructed in our primary socialization as children,"
Thompson observes, "the reality of law which the law of contract
first constructs tends to retain forever its massive power over us."'"
Thus, despite the declining reign of liberal-individualist
thought in the law of contracts, it nonetheless continues to retain a
significant foothold in modern contracting theory.92 It serves even
now to promote a conception of the market as a natural institution,
devoid of political, social, cultural or economic color.93 Most
notably for the purpose of this discussion it serves to uphold the
status quo by concealing the inequalities and power differentials
that both shape and are shaped by the dynamics of social relations.

90.

Dewar, The Normal Chaos of Family Law, 16 O.J.L.S. 725 (1996).

91. Thompson, The Law of Contract, in THE CRITICAL LAWYERS' HANDBOOK
69 (Pluto Press 1992).
92. Indeed Friedman, in Contract as Promise, staged something of a minirevival for liberal-individualism.
See Comments of EWAN MCKENDRICK,
CONTRACT LAW 3 (Macmillan 2d ed. 1994).
93. See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1983).
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It does this, it is suggested, by means of the paradigm of discrete
contracting. In accounts of the contractual process in judicial
narrative, the discrete paradigm serves to divorce the contractual
event from the wider context in which that event takes place. In
doing so, the various constraints, pressures and inequalities shaping
the parties' conduct are concealed from view. Contract, thus,
serves to "provide a cloak of legitimacy to the underlying
inequalities
of power in society such as those of class, gender and
94
race."
It is not of course to be assumed that law reform will provide a
universal panacea to these or any other ills or indeed that it is
possible to eliminate inequality by means of law alone. There is no
automatic guarantee, for a start, that the replacement of the State's
will for that of the parties is necessarily the more conducive to
social wellbeing. Human nature, moreover, is surprisingly resilient
and resourceful in the face of legal proscription. Individuals often
adapt rather than obey directory or prohibitory laws, and not
necessarily in a manner that is illegal.
It may well be said that in as much as growing confidence in
humanity and the rationalist conviction that, left unfettered,
humankind's progress was inevitable aided the demise of paternalist thinking in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, renewed
doubts about the inherently "good" nature of human individuals
led to its revival in the twentieth century. And yet in a very
pronounced manner, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries' trend
towards increased regulation and central administrative planning
exhibits a faith in science and reason; an optimism unsuited to these
cynical times. A strong faith in the ultimate efficacy of legal
regulation underscores a regulative framework that has often failed
to make any impact in real terms and in fact has frequently yielded
precisely the opposite results to those intended. The assumption of
straightforward obedience in the face of legal regulation is arguably
misplaced. This is not to say that disobedience is rife but rather
that legislative endeavors often fail adequately to account for the
extent to which commercial agents adapt to legal forces, redeploying commercial resources in a manner most conducive to profit
within the confines of a particular legal system.

94. MCCOUBREY & WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 226
(Blackstone 2nd ed. 1993) (quoting Thompson, The Law of Contract, in THE
CRITICAL LAWYERS' HANDBOOK 69).
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Legislators should not, for instance, lose sight of the latent and
undesired consequences of legislative reform. Peltzman, 95 for
instance, notes the possibly counterproductive effects of compulsory seat-belt ordinances which he found had, at least on their
initial introduction, the unintended effect of lulling some drivers
into a false sense of security. This in turn inflated the potential for
speeding, culminating in additional road accidents. Similarly,
Trebilcock 9 notes some of the "displacement effects" of rent
control legislation, for example in the inception of various hidden
charges, a reduction in the quality of available accommodation or
an outright decrease in availability of lodgings as buildings are (as
personal utility maximization dictates) turned over to more
profitable uses. The automatic right to a new fixed tenancy for life
after a stipulated period of occupation by a tenant, (under § 13 of
the (Irish) Landlord and Tenant Act, 1980, for instance) can
precipitate the strategic termination of tenancies by landlords,
concerned to avoid being stuck with an immovable "super-tenant."
As Trebilcock and Dewees comment, "feasible corrective policies
...... may prove "even more costly than the original problem. One

must not blindly assume that the cure is preferable to the disease."'
By the same token, it must not readily be assumed that where
persons observe the law their motivation is solely one of adherence
to legal requirements. To posit, for instance, that individuals fulfill
their contractual promises simply because legal sanctions will
otherwise ensue fails fully to reflect the reality of market and other
transactions. When people make promises or formulate contracts,98
more often then not they "contemplate performance, not breach.,
Parties with roughly equal bargaining status negotiating at arm's
length rarely enter into contracts which they believe at that time
not to be to their, either immediate or ultimate, benefit. The
chances are, surrounding circumstances remaining constant, that
that view of utility will not change between the date of execution
and that of performance.
Of course, in a dynamic market, surrounding circumstances
may not necessarily remain static. A new offer may be made,
situations may change or a different view of existing contractual
95. Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. OF L. & ECON
677-725 (1975).
96. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACr 4-5 (Harvard
University Press 1993).
97. Trebilcock & Dewees, Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts, in
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 118 (Butterworth's 1981).
98. Hedley, supra note 35, at 13.
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arrangements taken such that the perceived utility in performing
such a promise may wane to the point of non-existence. Indeed, on
one view, contract doctrine itself seems to allow for the possibility
of "efficient breach" -where a contractor may break a promise to a
co-contractor in order to accept a more favorable offer from a third
party.' Where a party has ordered his affairs in reliance upon a
promise now not to be fulfilled, that party will most likely suffer
some detriment owing to his misplaced trust and reliance."° The
possibility of extra-legal normative sanctions-such as general
disapproval, representations of untrustworthiness to other potential
clients and the consequential damage to reputation, rupture in a
continuous relationship of dealing and failure to deal in the future may be sufficient to deter breach of promise in most cases.1
Adverse publicity and its effect upon promise-makers often provide
an extra-legal counter to breach of contract. Macauley observes
that
[w]hile we often read that increasing bureaucratic organization
has made the world impersonal, this is not always the case.
Social fields cutting across formal lines exist within
bureaucracies, creating rich sanction systems ... . Social
networks serve as communication systems. People gossip and
this creates reputational sanctions. 1°2
That said, legal measures, particularly when the policy underlying it
is based on the concept of equality, should not be assessed solely in
terms of changes in the conduct of persons or by reference to the
observance of rules alone. Stoddard,1 3 for instance, identifies no
99. See the discussion in TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
172, 186 (Harvard University Press 1993); and Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of
Contract:Circles in the Sky, 68 VIRG. L. REV. 947 (1982).
100. Although the party so aggrieved is obliged to mitigate, to as great an
extent as possible, the damage caused to his business by the other party's breach.
101. See BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (Free
Press 1974); and in COHEN, DEVIANCE AND CONTROL Chs. 8, 9 (Prentice Hall
1965). Both contend that individuals may be prompted to obey social norms by
the prospect of extra-legal sanctions. The extent to which a person will do so
depends on the "stake in conformity" that he possesses in respect of the group that
judges him. This in turn is shaped by various contingencies, but most particularly
by the extent to which his well-being, financial, social and emotional, depends on
continued membership of the group.
102. Macauley, An Empirical View of Contract, [1985] WISC. L. REV. 465.
103. T. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (1997). See also id. (for the responses thereto,
especially that of Feldblum, The Moral Rhetoric of Legislation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
992). See also Whyte, Public Interest Litigation in Ireland- The Emergence of the
Affirmative Decree?, 20 DUBLIN U. L. J. 198 (1998).
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less than five general goals of law reform."4 The first three are well
known: "(1) to create new rights and remedies for victims, (2) to
alter the conduct of government [and] (3) to alter the conduct of
citizens and private entities."'' 5 Stoddard, however, goes further to
assert that law reform may, through "the expression of new moral
ideals and standards," serve not merely to change the rules by
which society is governed but to hold out the prospect of changing
"cultural attitudes and patterns" too. °6 This he terms the "cultureshifting" role of law.0 7 While acknowledging the difficulty involved
in testing the impact of this "symbolic" function of law, 1° Stoddard
holds that where there is general public awareness of legal reform, a
general sense of its legitimacy and a consistent enforcement thereof
the process of social change can be buttressed by legal reforms39
Arguably, there are too many contingencies in this
formulation, too many factors on which the success of legal
measures depend. Nevertheless, it is perhaps in these symbolic or
hortatory elements that many laws harbor their strongest prospects
of impacting on social behavior. One Irish example is that given by
Norris in an article"' preceding the decriminalization of male
homosexual sexual activity in Ireland."' He argues that although
the relevant statutes"' criminalizing such behavior were almost
never invoked against individual gay men,"3 they provided a

104. Stoddard, supra note 103, at 972.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 977-78.
108. Id. at 974.
109. Stoddard, supra note 103, at 978. The present writer makes a similar point,
albeit in the rather different context of criminal law, in Ryan, "Queering" the
Criminal Law: Some Thoughts on the Aftermath of Homosexual Decriminalisation,
7 IRISH CRIM. L.J. 38-47 (1997). There the point is made that while legal reform on
its own cannot eliminate social prejudices, it can strip away certain justificatory
backdrops in reference to which prejudicial beliefs or conduct were formerly
legitimated. See id. at 45-47.
110. Norris, Homosexual Law Reform in Ireland: A Progress Report, 1 DUBLIN
U. L.J. 27 (1977).
111. Most male homosexual sexual activity was banned in the Republic of
Ireland until 1993, when the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993 created an
equal age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual sex. See Ryan, supra note
109.
112. Offences Against the Person Act, §§ 61-62, 1861; Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, § 11, 1881.
113. The present author's own research confirms this point. "The simple fact,
as a survey of the Garda Sfochina [police] Reports from 1971 shows, is that for
some two decades prior to decriminalisation, the incidence of prosecution for socalled 'unnatural offences' was comparatively low, less than 70 cases per annum."
Ryan, supra note 109, at 46.
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"justificatory backdrop" to prejudicial behavior directed at the gay
community in general. The State regularly cited the former ban on
male homosexual sexual acts, to justify, for example, the censorship
of media reports and textual materials dealing with the issue of
homosexuality, the refusal to fund gay-specific HIV education
schemes and the failure to distribute condoms to stem the tide of
HIV/AIDS.'"
The subsequent reform of these laws (and
introduction of a roughly equal age of consent between heterosexual and homosexual sexual activity)"5 may not, of themselves
have changed social attitudes."6 What cannot be denied however, is
that an important means of justifying prejudicial treatment had
been stripped away and denied as a strategic tool to those who
opposed equal treatment in this area.
VII. Rhetoric vs. Reality
Lord Denning's stance then may not have been quite so na'fve
as asserted at the beginning of this paper. Nonetheless, those
approaching the study of law and its impacts cannot simply assume
that there will always be a necessary correlation between legal
decree and social behavior. Law is but one of many factors that
control and influence behavior. It is arguable that in some contexts
-in particular in regard to the long-term contractual or familial
relation-it is not even the dominant factor in this field. The
assumption, thus, that the law can, single-handedly and effectively
combat inequality and oppression is misplaced. Indeed there is
even some danger in this assumption. Too many jurists and judges
err in assuming that formal legal equality and true equal treatment
are one and the same phenomenon. Take, for instance, the
assumption that husband and wife are equal at law."7 As a
114. See e.g., PHILPOTr, DEEP END 190 (Poolbeg Press 1995); and Philpott in
the IRISH TIMES, Nov. 30, 1992.
115. See generally, Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993.
116. Cf. Hart, The Enforcement of Morality, in THE MORALITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 44 (Magnes Press and Oxford University Press 1965); and Walker,
Morality and Criminal Law, How. J. OF CRIM. (1946). Both point out that five
years after the decriminalization of suicide in the United Kingdom, a majority of
survey respondents in the UK who were aware of the aforementioned change in
the law still considered suicide to be "morally wrong."
117. On marital and gender equality in Ireland, see Tilson v. A.G., [1951] I.R. 1
(establishing the equal custodial rights of mother and father); DeBurca v. A.G.,
[1976] I.R. 38 (abolishing the rule that obliged only men to serve on juries); T.
O'G. v An Bord Uchtila, [1986] I.L.R.M. 61 (establishing the equal status of
widowers and widows in relation to adoption); C.M. v. T.M., [1988] I.L.R.M. 456;
[1991] I.L.R.M. 268; and W. v. W., [1993] I.L.R.M. 294 (abolishing the dependent
domicile rule in its application to married women); McKinley v. Minister for
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corollary to this assumption, the law of contract long ago rejected
the proposition that a wife was to be presumed to have acted under
the influence of her husband when entering into contracts that were
to her manifest disadvantage."8 The courts of both the United
Kingdom" 9 and Ireland' 20 have thus roundly rejected the proposition that wives are deserving of any "special equity" in undue
influence cases, asserting that such treatment would offend the
principle of equality between husbands and wives.
Certainly the modern marital relation operates in an
environment of some considerable spousal equality. Of its counterpart of some decades ago, by contrast, Edwards felt able to say that
there still remains a considerable proportion of married women
who regard their husbands as their lord and master to disobey
whose commands would be unthinkable."' 2'

Intimations of a

dramatic reform of marital relations however, face the accusation
that a significant number, perhaps even the majority of modern
cases where undue influence is alleged in Ireland and Great Britain
involve husbands and wives122 or those inan intimate relationship.'23
Those allegedly subjected to the influence tend, moreover, overwhelmingly to be female; those said to have exerted such influence
are almost always male. The rhetoric of law, however, appears to
Defence, [1992] 2 I.R. 333, (extending the right to sue for loss of consortium, once
reserved to husbands, to wives). See also the discussion of Scannell, The
Constitution and the Role of Women, in DEVALERA'S CONSTITUrION AND OURS
(Gill and Macmillan/RTt 1988).
118. See Howes v. Bishop, [1909] 2 K.B. 390; and the Bank of Montrdal v.
Stuart, [1911] A.C. 120 (where it was held that the existence of a relationship of
trust and confidence giving rise to the danger of undue influence must be expressly
proven to exist in each respective case of a husband and wife). There seems to
have been some considerable earlier authority for this proposition: See Nedby v.
Nedby, 5 De G. & Sm. 377, 64 E.R. 1161; Grigby v. Cox, 1 Ves. Sen. 517; Barron v.
Willis, [1899] 2 Ch.D. 578; [1902] A.C. 271. For additional modern authority see
the decision of the Privy Council in Mackenzie v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1934]
A.C. 468 (Appeal from S.C. of Ont.) (per Lord Atkin at 475). But see, the U.S.
decision of Eubanks v. Eubanks, 159 S.E.2d. 562, where Justice Sharp remarks that

"[t]he relationship between husband and wife is the most confidential of all
relationships, and transactions between them, to be valid, must be fair and
reasonable." Cf.State (D.P.P.) v. Walsh, [1981] I.R. 412.
119. Barclay's Bank v. O'Brien, [1994] 1 A.C. 180.
120. See Justice Keane in Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hogan, unreported, High
Court, Keane J., December 21, 1992, at 13; and Justice Murphy in the Supreme
Court in the same case at [19961 3 I.R. 239, 247-49.
121. Edwards, Compulsion, Coercion and Criminal Responsibility, 14 MOD. L.
REV. 297, 312-13 (1951).
122. See e.g., BCCI v. Aboody, [1990] 1 Q.B. 923; CIBC Mortgages v. Pitt,
[1994] 1 A.C. 200.
123. See e.g., Massey v. Midland Bank plc., [1995] 1 All E.R. 929; [1994] 2
F.L.R. 342 (where the parties were unmarried).
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have de-gendered this process.' By adhering to the legal ideal of
gender equality, the courts may ironically have done a considerable
disservice to that goal.
VIII. Conclusion
Legal commentators must, therefore, remain mindful of the
danger of the rhetoric of law clouding the real inequalities that exist
in society. The path from the creation of a law to its effective
enforcement is nothing if not fraught with barriers. For those
studying law and its impact on social behavior, then, the challenge
is to devise and discover the best means of maximizing the impact
of law and legal discourses. The first step on this road, it is
suggested, is to acknowledge the existence of and impact of
complex, long-term contractual and familial relations.
The
"discrete," context-free approach favored by traditional contract
theorists can only hamper the task of devising effective rules to
combat unequal treatment and oppression. However tidy and
convenient the discrete approach may be, an effective, realistic
analysis of the impact of laws requires a wider, more contextsensitive approach to human inter-relationships.
Certainly, this may involve an acceptance of the marginality of
law in social and business spheres alike. A more "law-skeptical"
approach may, indeed, be an inevitable by-product of such a
process. The success of legal reform, however, depends heavily on
one's appreciation of the limitations of law and legal discourses in
altering behavior patterns. Before these limitations can be overcome, they must be more fully appreciated. Ironically then, without
a dramatic change in perspective, the marginalization of the law
may be guaranteed.

124. In fact in Barclay's Bank v. O'Brien, [1994] 1 A.C. 180, Lord BrowneWilkinson makes reference to homosexual as well as heterosexual cohabitees.
Though his equation of same-sex and opposite-sex couples is welcome, the
implication that undue influence is 'gender-free' is not. His Lordship's comments
seem to imply that the gender of the parties is irrelevant in these cases.

